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Models of Pre-Promulgation Review of Legislation
RACHEL J. MYERS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Pre-promulgation review seeks to harmonize legislation with the constitution by engaging
in a dialogue among government institutions that seeks to prevent unconstitutional legislation from
becoming law. Pre-promulgation review is an integral part of the lawmaking process, and this
study seeks to unite scholarship on different methods of this review in a comparative survey to
assist lawyers, policymakers, and scholars. A wide range of institutions may fulfill the function of
reviewing proposed legislation for compliance with the constitution or other codes of national
importance prior to their passage into law. Because of this diversity, scholarship on the topic of
pre-promulgation review is split between discussions of legislative debate and judicial review by
courts, rather than as a distinct mechanism. The following analysis presents seven models of prepromulgation review currently in practice around the world, further divided into subcategories for
a total of thirteen approaches. This taxonomy of pre-promulgation constitutional review of
legislation presents a framework for thinking comparatively about the various mechanisms
currently in use across the world. Rather than a comprehensive catalogue, the purpose of this
taxonomy is to provide a concise overview of overarching commonalities of states’ prepromulgation review mechanisms to provide categories of the approaches. The framework invites
further development through additional cases and refinement of its categories as this area of
institutional design distinguishes itself in the literature.
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II. FACTORS SHAPING PRE-PROMULGATION REVIEW MECHANISMS
History,1 regime type,2 religious traditions,3 the power of the judiciary, and the influence
of international institutions are a few of the contextual factors that shape the type of prepromulgation review mechanism a country follows. Other useful characteristics for thinking about
the categories are the degree of power possessed by the reviewing institution and the function or
purpose of the review. These factors differ from country to country even within each category of
the taxonomy.
The regularity and formalization of the pre-promulgation review process determines the
power of the body tasked with the responsibility. Even countries that task the same body and have
similar procedures for review will establish different degrees of review authority depending on
which institutions are authorized to initiate the review process. Review bodies with discretion to
review any or all proposed legislation prior to promulgation will have far greater influence over
ensuring compliance of legislation with the constitution if the review body may only exercise its
review power when called upon by another government actor. Benign and strategic justifications
for not employing a process to review all legislation with the formal pre-promulgation mechanism
exist. The volume of legislative proposals introduced may make comprehensive review
impractical. The degree of formalization of the process in the countries cited for each model is
noted in the discussion below.

1

In particular, history of colonialism, other institutional legacies, etc.
Such as consolidated democracy, hybrid or illiberal democracy, monarchy, theocracy, etc.
3
For example, Thailand and Sri Lanka include provisions in their respective constitutions requiring the government
to protect and uphold the values of Buddhism. Countries with Islamic law may have pre-promulgation review
mechanisms that address consistency with religious doctrine either as a part of or separate from their constitutions.
Ran Hirschl, Comparative Constitutional Law and Religion, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN ASIA 316,
325, 329 (Rosalind Dixon & Tom Ginsburg eds., 2014).
2
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III. MODELS OF PRE-PROMULGATION REVIEW
This section presents seven overarching models currently in use by states based on the
review body authorized to complete the pre-promulgation review. Building on a combination of
country and region-specific scholarship4 on pre-promulgation constitutional review of legislation,
the taxonomy presented here seeks to simplify, generalize, and expand the categories to describe
the university of mechanisms developed around the world. In this taxonomy, the categories are
organized as follows, and broken down further into related subcategories: (1) Courts, (2)
Independent Review Committees, (3) Independent Legal Representatives, (4) Legislatures, (5) the
Executive, (6) Religious Authorities, and (7) Institutional Collaboration.
At the outset, it is helpful to clearly define what kind of constitutional review falls within
the scope of this taxonomy. Pre-promulgation review is a form of abstract constitutional review.5
Abstract review is an assessment of the “constitutionality of laws without the need to establish a
concrete case or controversy – that is, in the abstract.”6 Abstract review is about facial
constitutionality,7 in contrast to other forms of judicial review in which constitutionality is assessed
in relation to the specific circumstances of a case (concrete review) or an claim of a particular
rights violation (constitutional complaint review8).9

The taxonomy presented here builds, in part, on Maartje De Visser’s detailed exploration of constitutional review
in Europe. De Visser devotes a chapter to describing non-judicial actors engaged in upholding the constitution and
discusses in detail the role of constitutional courts engaged in a priori review in the European countries that employ
these approaches. See generally MAARTJE DE VISSER, CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS (2014).
5
Id. at 97 (“Furthermore, a priori review is of necessity abstract, as a law that has not yet entered into force cannot
have triggered constitutional doubts in the context of an individual case.”).
6
BENJAMIN BRICKER, VISIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: A COMPARATIVE EXAMINATION OF COURTS AND POLICY IN
DEMOCRACIES 5, 7 (2016); see also DE VISSER, supra note 4, at 18 (“[I]t’s examination is necessarily ex ante and
abstract in nature.”).
7
DE VISSER, supra note 4, at 99.
8
As discussed below, constitutional complaint review can also be a form of pre-promulgation review when raised
based on concerns that pending legislation will infringe constitutional rights.
9
BRICKER, supra note 6, at 7.
4
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Each of the models that follow are a form of pre-promulgation, abstract, constitutional
review of legislation, categorized by the institution reviewing the legislation. As will be illustrated
in the discussions of each category, many intersecting factors – including those identified in the
preceding section – and relationships among the institutions involved create levels of complexity
and variation even within the categories themselves.
A. Courts
In most countries, courts are considered the primary institutions responsible for interpreting
and upholding the provisions of the constitution.10 However, pre-promulgation review is not the
most common posture for assessing constitutionality. Ex ante, a posterior, concrete review of
constitutional violations resulting from promulgated legislation remains the norm.11 Since World
War II, the trend towards creating and granting constitutional courts some form of prepromulgation review has greatly increased.12
1. Constitutional Courts
Constitutional courts are “single, centralized bodies designed to perform constitutional
judicial review,” and many “allow institutional actors to directly challenge the constitutionality of
laws.”13 Based on data collected through their research,14 Tom Ginsburg and Scott Elkins noted
that by 2006 81% of constitutional courts had pre-promulgation review powers.15 A few illustrative
examples from the European Union (EU) include France, Hungary, Spain, the Czech Republic,
Poland, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.16

10

See DE VISSER, supra note 4, at 11.
See id. at 111.
12
Tom Ginsburg & Zachary Elkins, Ancillary Powers of Constitutional Courts, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1431, 1445 (2009).
13
BRICKER, supra note 6, at 5.
14
The data was collected through what is now known as the Constitute Project, https://www.constituteproject.org/.
15
Ginsburg & Elkins, supra note 12, at 1445.
16
DE VISSER, supra note 4, at 100.
11
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In most countries that follow this approach, courts do not have the power to review any
legislative proposals they choose. Another institutional actor, such as the legislature or executive,
holds the authority to seek the review of the court. In most countries, the referring institutions are
other governmental actors, but in Belgium private actors are also authorized to refer abstract
questions of constitutionality to the constitutional court.17
2. Constitutional Councils
Constitutional councils are based on the French model, established in 1958.18 At its
inception, “[t]he Conseil [C]onstitionnel’s principal function consisted of hearing challenges
against laws before their promulgation in order to make sure that they did not fall foul of the
distribution of powers between the government and Parliament laid down in the 1958
constitution.”19 The French constitutional council has been “considered the archetype of a court
competent to hear a priori constitutionality challenges.”20 Until 2008, the Conseil Constitutionnel
had only pre-promulgation review authority and enacted statutes were immune from challenges.21
The Conseil Constitutionnel strengthened its power by issuing a decision in 1971 claiming
the authority to review laws for compliance substantive constitutional provisions and fundamental
rights, and in 1974 a constitutional amendment gave minority legislators the authority to request
review of legislation – whereas that power had previously been reserved only to the leaders of
parliament and the executive and those in the political majority.22 The historical development is

17

Id. at 99.
Id. at 59.
19
Id. at 60.
20
Id. at 101.
21
Id. at 100.
22
Id.
18
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important, because these features are now considered hallmarks of the constitutional council model
of constitutional review, and the institution has been adopted in many other countries.23
The model is prevalent in former French colonies, where it was widely adopted.24 For
example, the constitutional courts25 in Thailand and Cameroon are based on this model.26 In each
case, the model has variations. In Cameroon, the constitutional council is limited to only reviewing
legislation at the pre-promulgation stage, rather than holding that power in combination with postpromulgation and concrete review.27
In addition to the historical emphasis of the model on pre-promulgation review, two main
differences distinguish constitutional councils from constitutional courts. For one, members of
constitutional councils, under the French model, are not required to have legal training.28
Additionally, constitutional councils were designed with an emphasis on their advisory role, in
contrast to the power often vested in courts to issue binding decisions on other government actors.
It should be noted that in practice neither of these characteristics are strictly delineated between
these two institutions. Constitutional courts sometimes include members from nonlegal
backgrounds, and some constitutional councils exercise binding authority.29

23

Tom Ginsburg, Constitutional Courts in East Asia, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN ASIA, 47, 61
(Rosalind Dixon & Tom Ginsburg eds., 2014) [hereinafter Constitutional Courts in East Asia].
24
Id. at 69.
25
In other countries, the constitutional council model is sometimes labeled a constitutional court, but such examples
still fall in this category based on possessing the specific characteristics of the constitutional council model that
originated in France.
26
Tom Ginsburg, Constitutional Courts in East Asia: Understanding Variation, 3 J. COMP. L. 80, 88 (2008)
[hereinafter Understanding Variation]; Charles Manga Fombad, Protecting Constitutional Values in Africa: A
Comparison of Botswana and Cameroon, 36 COMP. & INT’L L. J. S. AFR. 83, 101 (2003).
27
Fombad, supra note 26, at 99–100.
28
DE VISSER, supra note 4, at 59; see Understanding Variation, supra note 26, at 92.
29
See, e.g., DE VISSER, supra note 4, at 213 (Italy’s constitutional court includes a number of law professors).
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3. Committees Within Courts
This category of pre-promulgation review is effectively a constitutional council situated
within the institution of the supreme court. A defining feature of constitutional courts is that they
review only questions of constitutional law.30 In contrast, supreme courts hear issues relating to
the legal system as a whole, which may or may not include constitutional issues.31 An option that
falls between authorizing the supreme court to assess constitutional issues and establishing a
separate constitutional court is to create a constitutional committee within the supreme court with
special expertise and jurisdiction over questions of constitutionality.32
Estonia’s constitution establishes a constitutional review chamber within the supreme
court.33 In the scope of its pre-promulgation review powers, the president of Estonia may request
from the chamber an assessment of legislation proposed by the parliament.34 In the Estonian
system, this authority applies in cases in which the parliament resubmits an act that the president
has already returned once without signing into law – a power used sparingly.35 Algeria’s
constitution also details the pre-promulgation review process as a consultation with the
constitutional council by the legislature and executive.36 In each of these cases, the court’s review
committee is not independently authorized to review legislation for constitutionality; it must be
prompted to do so by another government actor. This process means only select laws are subjected
to pre-promulgation review for constitutionality, and the legislature, executive, and other political
bodies are free to bypass this step.

30

Id. at 95.
See id. at 95–96.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 96.
34
Id. at 36.
35
Id.
36
CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA, Art. 141 (1989).
31
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B. Independent Review Committees
The category of independent review committees is illustrated by two institutions that
generally carry out the same function as the court-based bodies above, but that exist as independent
and unaffiliated from any branch of the government, and generally do not carry out other duties
aside from the primary role of pre-promulgation review of legislation.37
1. Council of State
An institution known as a council of state is the main example of pre-promulgation
constitutional review of legislation. In Europe this institution has a long history.38 Councils of state
are independent of the other branches and institutions of government and act as advisors to
government institutions such as the legislature and the executive.39 As De Visser defines their role,
“They can, and sometimes must, provide advisory opinions on legislative bills and proposals for
other legal norms.”40 This model exists in the EU countries of Belgium, France, Greece, Italy,
Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and Spain.41 In some countries councils of state are the only body
tasked with pre-promulgation constitutional review of legislation, as in Belgium and Greece.42 It
is also common for the council to fill its role in conjunction with a separate mandate held by the
judiciary or legislature, as in the Netherlands, France (sharing the role with the constitutional
council discussed above), Italy, Luxemburg, and Spain.43 The Dutch Council of State is consulted
prior to the passage of every piece of parliamentary legislation and is empowered to issue opinions
sua sponte, which the government then must take into account.44 In other systems, the government

37

Further examples of institutions that fit the general description may exist under different names in other countries.
DE VISSER, supra note 4, at 13.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 14.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 14–15.
38
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must engage the council over its input on legislative constitutionality, but is not required to follow
it, as in Belgium.45
2. Independent Commission for the Supervision of the Constitution
Constitutional review in Afghanistan is controversially split between the Supreme Court
the Independent Commission for the Supervision of the Constitution.46 In practice the power is
shared between these bodies and each has attempted to carve out a particular type of constitutional
jurisdiction, though the line between their respective purviews is not always followed.47 Since
2010, the commission has established itself in the role of pre-promulgation review of legislative
bills in an advisory capacity for both the legislature and the executive and at their request.48
C. Independent Legal Representatives
What distinguishes independence legal representatives from court committees and other
designated committees for legislative review is that this is a position for a single individual who is
not a member of any court, and is meant to be independent from the legislature, executive, and
other institutions of the government.
1. Chancellors of Justice
The position of chancellor of justice is an independent position appointed by the president
or parliament. According to De Visser’s study of constitutional review in Europe, this position
exists in Finland, Estonia, and Sweden.49 In Finland, the constitution calls on the chancellor to
ensure the constitutionality and lawfulness of government acts and legislation.50 The chancellor

45

Id. at 17.
Shamshad Pasarlay, Restraining Judicial Power: The Fragmented System of Judicial Review and Constitutional
Interpretation in Afghanistan, 26 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 245, 248 (2018).
47
Id. at 249.
48
Id. at 275–77.
49
DE VISSER, supra note 4, at 20
50
Id.; CONSTITUTION OF FINLAND 1999 (rev. 2011), Section 112.
46
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works in close conjunction with the Finnish Constitutional Law Committee, a parliamentary
committee discussed below. In Estonia the chancellor reviews proposed legislative for
constitutional conformity when called upon by a parliamentary committee; therefore, there is not
a mandate for the chancellor’s review of every piece of legislation.51 However, another avenue for
the chancellor’s influence is in comments on legal drafts included on the parliament’s daily agenda.
In practice, it is not feasible or necessary for the chancellor to comment on every piece of
legislation, but the chancellor has discretion to prioritize which pieces of legislation she addresses,
and in the majority of cases the government accounts for her comments in revisions prior to
passage.52
2. Defender or Commissioner of Constitutional Rights
Another model involving a special judicial expert to asses constitutionality of draft
legislation is through an appointed defender or commissioner of constitutional rights “with the task
of ensuring that public authorities duly respect individuals’ rights and the freedoms as enshrined
in the constitution.”53 Countries that use this approach in Europe include Finland, France, Hungary,
Poland, and Spain.54 This mechanism can be used either during the pre-promulgation phase as well
as to challenge legislation after it has been passed. The defender of constitutional rights role exists
in many places outside Europe, though it is more frequently used to challenge post-promulgation
applications of statutes and laws that are asserted to be violations of individual rights as applied.55

51

DE VISSER, supra note 4, at 21.
Id. at 22.
53
Id. at 45–46.
54
Id. at 46.
55
See, e.g., BRICKER, supra note 6, at 7.
52
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D. Legislatures
In keeping with allocating primary law-making authority to the legislature, one model is to
assign responsibility for ensuring constitutionality of proposed legislation to the legislature as a
whole, or to both houses in the case of bicameral legislatures. Bahrain is one example of a country
whose constitution follows this model.56
1. Upper House
In bicameral legislatures, the upper house of parliament often plays a greater role in
constitutional assessment of legislation, whereas the lower house focuses on political and
legislative policy issues.57 The justification for this is the idea that the upper house is somewhat
more removed from daily political pressures, and therefore in a better position to assess neutrally
and appeal to constitutional rather than political principles.58 In the Netherlands, the Senate fills
the constitutional assessment role, consistent with this model.59 The Senate bears the responsibility
for upholding the constitution in passing legislation, rather than outsourcing the role to separate
institution to provide an outside check.
2. Parliamentary Committees
Preparatory work in the development of legislation commonly takes place in designated
committees composed of members of parliament, which some are specifically tasked with
reviewing the constitutionality of legislative proposals.
Finland’s Constitution states, “The Constitutional Law Committee shall issue statements
on the constitutionality of legislative proposals and other matters brought for its consideration, as

56

Id.
Id. at 25.
58
See id.
59
Id.; see also Grondwet voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden (Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands)
Art. 85.
57
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well as on their relation to international human rights treaties.”60 The Constitutional Law
Committee is comprised of at least seventeen members elected in parliament by secret ballot, and
its role is conducted in connection with the role of Finland’s chancellor of justice (discussed
above), who refers legislative proposals she deems constitutionally questionable to the committee
before the legislature moves forward with its passage.61 The committee’s process of review begins
with a hearing which includes consultations with civil servants and experts, such as professors of
constitutional law, followed by an internal meeting where the committee decides its position on
the constitutional question and advises the parliament on how to proceed or revise the legislation.62
The committee’s decisions are not officially binding, but are customarily followed in the Finnish
system.63
The United Kingdom’s twelve-member House of Lords Constitution Committee was
established in 2001 with a mandate to “examine all public bills introduced to the House of Lords
for matters of constitutional significance.”64 The committee requests information and prepares
reports on bills that raise “questions of principle about principal parts of the Constitution.”65 The
House of Lords is expected to consider the report and respond to it within two months.66
E. The Executive
A common constitutional provision relating to the executive branch is an assertion of
responsibility on the head of state to uphold the constitution. This mandate applies both to the
heads’ of states own behavior and policy enactments and in their role as a check on the legislature

60

Constitution of Finland 1999 (rev. 2011), Section 74.
DE VISSER, supra note 4, at 21, 28.
62
Id. at 27.
63
Id. at 28.
64
Id. at 30.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 30–31.
61
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through the signing of proposed legislation into law.67 Heads of state may be authorized to assess
constitutionality independently and additionally to consult other bodies of review for
constitutionality questions. The emphasis in this category as a mechanism of pre-promulgation
constitutional review of legislation is that the executive power is exercised based on the
justification of an assessment of constitutionality, not some other executive interest.
1. Democratic Heads of State: Veto with Constitutional Justifications
The power to sign legislation vests substantial power in the head of state to determine the
validity of legislation, and the executive’s approval or refusal to sign may be based on assessments
of constitutionality. As a mechanism, the power of heads of state in parliamentary and presidential
democracies share basic similarities. In some systems the power described here is exercised by a
prime minister and in others by a president. In Estonia, as in many other cases, the president may
send back draft legislation for revision if he or she deems it unconstitutional.68 German federal
presidents also have the explicit power to refuse to promulgate legislation they deem to be
unconstitutional.69
2. Constitutional Monarchs
Constitutional monarchies are varied in the degree of power monarchs have in the final say
over whether proposed legislation is constitutional. On one end of the spectrum is Luxemburg,
whose constitution was revised in 2009 to remove the requirement of monarchic approval of
legislation entirely, rendering executive signature of laws submitted by the legislature a procedural
formality.70 However, on the other extreme another common model of pre-promulgation review

67

Id. at 36.
Id.
69
Id. at 40.
70
Id.; Luxembourg's Constitution of 1868, Art. 34.
68
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empowers the monarch with a high degree of autonomy to determine the constitutionality of
legislation without consultation to another review body or deference to the legislature.
Between these extremes is the model followed by Bahrain, which is similar to the role of
the head of state in parliamentary and presidential democracies discussed above, in which the king
is granted the authority to request review from the constitutional court on the validity of proposed
legislation. Bahrain’s constitution indicates, “The King may refer to the Court any draft laws
before they are adopted to determine the extent of their agreement with the Constitution. The
Court’s determination is binding on all State authorities and on everyone.” 71 The process is a
middle ground in terms of the level of power vested in the monarch, because while the king
controls which legislation is submitted to the court for review, once the court has opined the king
cannot overrule it.
Other countries that employ models falling into one of the other identified categories may
involve royal actors. For example, the Dutch monarch is the formal head of the Constitutional
Council, but, in practice, the vice-president leads the institution.72
F. Religious Authorities
Many constitutions recognize religious authority as protected or authoritative. Ran Hirschl
presents three categories of constitutional and religious authority interplay: (1) “constitutional
‘secularism’ alongside religious pluralism (e.g. India);” (2) “preferential constitutional treatment
of a particular religion of group of religions but without exclusive establishment of a single faith
as a ‘state religion’ or a mandatory source of legislation (e.g. Thailand, Cambodia, Sri Lanka[,]
and

71
72

other

predominantly

Buddhist

countries);”

Constitution of Bahrain, Art. 106 (2002).
DE VISSER, supra note 4, at 15.
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and

(3)

“varieties

of

‘Islamic

constitutionalism’…(i.e. full endorsement of Islam as the single state religion and its establishment
as ‘a’ or ‘the’ source of legislation).”73 The status of religion within the constitution influences
how the government will assess religion in pre-promulgation review of legislation.
On example is in the Islamic Republic of Iran where an independent religious authority
called the Guardian Council has the constitutional authority to review and determine the
compliance of proposed legislation with Islamic principles.74 The Iranian constitution describes
this procedure:
All legislation passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly [the legislature] must
be sent to the Guardian Council. The Guardian Council must review it within a
maximum of ten days from its receipt with a view to ensuring its compatibility with
the criteria of Islam and the Constitution. If it finds the legislation incompatible, it
will return it to the Assembly for review. Otherwise the legislation will be deemed
enforceable.75
G. Institutional Collaboration
The concept behind this category is that multiple actors are simultaneously tasked with
specifically considering the constitutional implication of legislation throughout a collaborative
drafting process. This approach is in contrast to the process outlined in the above models in which
legislative debate and assessment of constitutionality is siloed among various actors at particular
stages of legislative drafting, revision, and approval. Instead of establishing a referral mechanism
to particular actors to review legislative proposals, multiple government institutions are involved
consistently throughout the drafting and revision process – and each of these institutions must
specifically consider constitutionality in its assessment.

73

Hirschl, supra note 3, at 317.
Qanuni Assassi Jumhurii Islamai Iran [The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran] Art. 4, 72, 94, 112
[1980].
75
Id. Art. 94.
74
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The description of this category is drawn from a major legislative reform effort in the Lao
People’s Democratic Republic.76 A recent report conducted by the Ministry of Justice of Lao and
the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) provides a useful description of their approach
to pre-promulgation review:
The notion of a “separation of powers”, with distinct roles and actors in legislative,
executive and judicial branches, is not deeply rooted in the current reality of the
Lao law-making process. Instead, a collaborative system, with actors from the
Ministry of Justice on the executive side, engaged in law drafting efforts with
individual members of the National Assembly, results in draft laws taking their
shape in the most part before they are finally submitted to the plenary session. Even
after the plenary session of the National Assembly holds its debates and suggests
revisions, the draft law may return to the original drafters who come from a mix of
different line ministries, as well as from the other agencies with the right of
legislative initiative.77
How this process is developed in Lao and whether other countries adopt this kind of
approach will clarify the definition of this category. At this stage, the purpose and method suggest
a distinct approach to pre-promulgation constitutional review of legislation.
III. RELEVANCE OF TAXONOMY AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This taxonomy of pre-promulgation review models intends to assist scholars and
policymakers in understanding the range of design options for ensuring legislative
constitutionality. It provides a framework of models from which to extend analysis to the
application and implication of using particular models to better understand their operation in
practice. From this starting point, several areas for further research are proposed below.

76

See generally, UNDP, The Law-Making Process in Lao PDR: A Baseline Study, Ministry of Justice and UNDP
LAO PDR (2015), http://www.la.undp.org/content/dam/laopdr/docs/Reports and publications/2015/2015-12-15
Baseline report-final version.pdf (last visited Sep. 9, 2018).
77
Id. at 14.
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A. Roles of Pre-Promulgation Review
The official role of pre-promulgation review is to review legislation to ensure proposed
laws are consistent with the constitution prior to their passage; however, the practice may serve a
number of governmental goals, towards both legitimate and informal ends. The function served by
pre-promulgation review may be shaped by the type of model employed. Future analyses could
further explore the association of particular pre-promulgation review models with different goals.
The goals suggested by this initial research include: (1) approving legislation, (2) recommending
revision to proposed legislation, (3) rejecting proposed legislation as incompatible with the
constitution, (4) rejecting proposed legislation for political or public policy reasons, (5) stalling or
preventing passage of legislation by governmental actors opposed to the law.
B. Multiple Institutions and Overlapping Mandates
Review by multiple committees can be of the same piece of legislation at different points
in its review and approval process, or legislation may be siloed by topic and sent to a particular
committee based on subject matter. A number of countries discussed above involved several
institutions overlapping to some degree in their pre-promulgation review role. In such cases,
institutions may be tasked with review of particular types of legislation or at different points in the
timeline of the legislative process. In addition to those cited above, a few cases are notable for the
complexity and number of actors involved in the pre-promulgation review process to assess
constitutionality. A central question that arises from this dynamic is the effect of combining
different approaches. Closer comparative case studies of countries in this taxonomy may yield
helpful information about how different actors and mechanisms may or may not work well
together.

17

C. Evaluating Power Dynamics of the Mechanism in Context
Many of the sources that informed this taxonomy include the scholar’s perspectives about
whether and which of these systems of pre-promulgation constitutional review are effective and in
what contexts. This study refrains from commenting on these issues, but the taxonomy could be
the basis for a study that inquired into how each mechanism operates in practice across countries.
Such a framework may aid further study into questions of what works well in particular types of
systems and what options are available to scholars and policy makers seeking to reform or
introduce new approaches.
D. Expanding and Refining the Categories
The best way to test the categories presented in this taxonomy is to expand the analysis to
additional countries and to seek to fit those new data points into the framework. Constitutions are
a useful place to begin this inquiry. However, while the mechanism for constitutional review may
be referenced in a country’s constitution, such provisions often do not specify when or how review
should occur. Furthermore, scholarship from country-specific experts often indicates that the
process is far different in practice from what the constitution proscribes. A case that does not fit
the proposed taxonomy may yield an addition or restructuring of the categories. Further research
in this vein will contribute to an improved understanding of pre-promulgation constitutional
review of legislation. The country index below contains a list of all the country cases included in
this initial study.
IV. CONCLUSION
The categories proposed herein are a possible framework to think broadly and
comparatively about the design options for pre-promulgation review mechanisms. The overview
presented her illustrates the need for further study of pre-promulgation review mechanisms as this
18

step in the legislative process receives growing recognition as a meaningful governmental design
question. Few comprehensive analyses of the role of legislatures and other actors in the legislative
drafting process in upholding constitutionality have been conducted.78 The mechanism selected
appears to have the potential to change power dynamics in government; therefore, policy makers
may seek to alter the approach in their countries either through procedural changes or formal
constitutional amendments, could elevate the influence of the constitution in controlling legislation
and have major implications for government policy.
V. COUNTRY INDEX79
Country

Model

Afghanistan

Algeria

Independent
Review
Committees
Courts

Bahrain

The Executive
Legislatures

Belgium

Cameroon
Estonia

Independent
Review
Committees
Courts
Courts
Independent Legal
Representatives

Subcategory

Independent Commission
for the Supervision of the
Constitution
Committees within
Courts
Constitutional Monarch
Parliamentary
Committees
Councils of State

Constitutional Council
Committees within
Courts
Chancellors of Justice

78

DE VISSER, supra note 4, at 23.
Data collected from Constitute Project, https://www.constituteproject.org/.
80
Constitution of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, Art. 141 (1989).
81
Constitution of Bahrain, Art. 106 (2002).
82
Id.
83
DE VISSER, supra note 4, at 13.
84
Constitution of Cameroon, Art. 471 (2008).
85
DE VISSER, supra note 4, at 36.
86
Id. at 21.
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Title of Review Body
(original language where
available)
Independent Commission for
the Supervision of the
Constitution
Constitutional Council80
King submits to
Constitutional Court81
Chamber of Deputies,
National Assembly82
Council of State83
Constitutional Council84
Constitutional Review
Chamber85
Chancellor of Justice
(Õiguskantsler)86

The Executive

Finland

Independent Legal
Representatives
Independent Legal
Representatives
Legislatures

France

Germany

Greece

Hungary

Democratic Head of
State: Veto with
Constitutional
Justification
Chancellors of Justice
Defender or
Commissioner of
Constitutional Rights
Parliamentary
Committees

Courts

Constitutional Council

Independent Legal
Representatives

Defender or
Commissioner of
Constitutional rights
Councils of State

Independent
Review
Committees
The Executive

Independent
Review
Committees
Courts
Independent Legal
Representatives

Iran

Religious
Authorities

Italy

Independent
Review
Committees

President87

Chancellor of Justice
(Oikeuskansleri)88
-

Constitutional Law
Committee
(Perustuslakivaliokunta)89
Constitutional Council
(Conseil constitutionnel)90
Council of State91

Democratic Head of
State: Veto with
Constitutional
Justification
Councils of State

Federal President92

Constitutional Courts
Defender or
commissioner of
constitutional rights
-

Constitutional Court94

Councils of State

87

Council of State93

Islamic Consultative
Assembly submits to the
Guardian Council95
Council of State96

Id. at 36.
Id. at 20.
89
Id. at 26.
90
Id. at 7.
91
Id. at 13.
92
Id. at 40.
93
Id. at 13.
94
Id. at 6.
95
Qanuni Assassi Jumhurii Islamai Iran [The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran] Art. 94 [1980].
96
DE VISSER, supra note 4, at 13.
88
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Lao PDR

Institutional
Collaboration

-

Luxemburg

The Executive
Independent
Review
Committees
Legislatures

Constitutional Monarch
Councils of State

Ministry of Justice, National
Assembly, original drafters,
other ministries97
Procedural signature only98
Council of State99

Upper House

Senate (Eerste Kamer)100

Independent
Review
Committees
Independent Legal
Representatives

Councils of State

The Dutch Council of
State101

Defender or
Commissioner of
Constitutional rights
Defender or
Commissioner of
Constitutional rights
Councils of State

-

Constitutional Council
Parliamentary
Committees

Constitutional Council103
House of Lords Constitution
Committee104

The
Netherlands

Poland

Spain

Thailand
United
Kingdom

Independent Legal
Representatives
Independent
Review
Committees
Courts
Legislatures

97

UNDP, supra note 76, at 14.
Id. at 40.
99
Id. at 13.
100
Id. at 25.
101
Id. at 14–15.
102
Id. at 13.
103
Constitutional Courts in East Asia, supra note 23, at 61.
104
DE VISSER, supra note 4, at 30.
98

21

Council of State102

